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A History of Competition: The Impact 
of Antitrust on Hong Kong’s 
Telecommunications Markets 
Sandra Marco Colino 
Hong Kong has only had cross-sector competition law since 
2015, but the city’s telecommunications markets have been subject 
to sector-specific antitrust provisions for over two decades. The 
importance of nurturing an efficient, innovative, and competitive 
telecoms industry for Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was 
acknowledged already at the time the sector was liberalized in the 
1990s. Yet until the late 2000s, the government vehemently 
opposed the adoption of competition law in virtually all other 
sectors of the economy. This paper examines the effectiveness of 
the regulatory framework set up to guarantee the protection of 
competition in the telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. The 
results of the liberalization process are certainly remarkable, and 
the city boasts very competitive telecoms markets. However, it is 
argued that the enthusiasm over the results of the liberalization 
process may have eclipsed important competition issues in local 
markets, which could have been tackled through the development 
of a robust antitrust policy, but which were sadly left unheeded. On 
the basis of the analysis of the history of (sector-specific) 
competition law in the telecoms sector, this Article assesses the 
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potential of the new Competition Ordinance to address the 
principal threats to competition in these markets. In doing so, the 
paper finds that, while the new regulatory framework may be 
generally suitable to combat collusion, it is less clear that it will 
effectively combat the problems associated with the creation of 
market power through mergers, or the abuse of that power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong is one of the latest jurisdictions to implement a 
fully-fledged competition law regime. The Hong Kong 
Competition Ordinance (“CO”) has been in force since December 
14, 2015,1 following an unusually lengthy three-and-a-half-year 
implementation process.2 The CO may be the city’s first cross-
sector competition act, but it is not the first piece of antitrust law to 
ever apply in this part of the world. Before 2015, two particular 
industries were subject to sector-specific legislation: 
telecommunications and broadcasting. In the mid-1990s, when 
telecommunications markets began to be liberalized, antitrust 
provisions were included in the licenses granted to telecoms 
operators. Shortly afterwards, in the early 2000s, competition law 
rules were added to the Telecommunications Ordinance (“TO”),3 
and similar provisions were included in the Broadcasting 
Ordinance (“BO”) when it was adopted that same decade.4 At the 
time, a resilient hostility towards competition law reigned in Hong 
Kong, despite a burgeoning clamor in favor of its adoption. Until 
2007, the government categorically opposed the introduction of 
comprehensive antitrust legislation, which was viewed as 
incompatible with the city’s fondness of minimal market 
intervention.5 The prompt embrace of competition law for 
telecommunications speaks volumes of the importance given by 
the Hong Kong legislator to the protection of competition in this 
fundamental industry. Moreover, if there was any doubt as to the 
sector’s antitrust uniqueness, the CO’s Merger Rule is currently 
 
1 Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 (H.K.). 
2 During this period, the Hong Kong Competition Commission and the Hong Kong 
Competition Tribunal were created. The former actively promoted various competition 
advocacy initiatives, issued substantive and procedural guidelines, and published 
leniency and enforcement priorities policy papers. 
3 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K–N (H.K.). The conduct 
rules were added in 2000, while the merger rule was introduced in 2003. 
4 Broadcasting Ordinance, (2001) Cap. 562, § 13–14 (H.K). For an analysis of this 
sector, see Kelvin H. F. Kwok, Abuse of Dominance in the Hong Kong Television 
Industry, in COMPETITION LAW IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS: KEY REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES (Sandra Marco Colino ed., forthcoming 2019). 
5 Thomas K. Cheng, A Tale of Two Competition Law Regimes—The Telecom-Sector 
Competition Regulation in Hong Kong and Singapore, 30 WORLD COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. REV. 501, 502 (2007). 
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only applicable to mergers affecting telecommunications, and the 
first case brought by the Hong Kong Competition Commission 
(“HKCC”) before the Hong Kong Competition Tribunal 
(“HKCT”) relates to the alleged bid rigging practices of various 
information technology (“IT”) companies in relation to the 
installation of an IT server system.6 
The efforts to foster competition in this sector reflect an 
understanding of the importance of nurturing a “dynamic, 
innovative, efficient and competitive telecommunications industry” 
for the region’s economic prosperity.7 In an increasingly 
globalized world, connectivity is fundamental for both personal 
and business interactions and requires the wide availability of 
consistent, affordable telecommunications services. In fact, there is 
a stark conviction that Hong Kong’s “coveted position as the 
regional centre for tertiary and quaternary activities . . . has been 
achieved through its unique mix of geographical advantages, 
regulatory framework, human capital, and not least, the availability 
of high quality telecommunications services at competitive 
prices.”8 Yet as a network industry—that is, one requiring the 
existence of a solid, widely accessible infrastructure—,9 its 
markets may be inclined to depart from the model of perfect 
competition and be prone to market failures: “products are 
heterogeneous, differentiation in products is common, the life 
 
6 Competition Tribunal Enforcement Action No. 1 of 2017, Notice Under Rule 19 of 
the Competition Tribunal Rules, (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.comptribunal.hk
/filemanager/case/en/upload/11/CTEA1-2017(E).pdf [https://perma.cc/S7S5-QUDG]; see 
also Adrian Emch, New Developments in Hong Kong’s First Case Under the 
Competition Ordinance (May 9, 2018), KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG, 
http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/05/09/new-developments-
hong-kongs-first-case-competition-ordinance [https://perma.cc/M59G-B65V]. See infra 
Section III.B. 
7 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION IN HONG 
KONG’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 2 (June 
2003), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/report/rp20030620.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/2VHH-XSY7] [hereinafter REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
COMPETITION] (drafting of the paper completed by Spectrum Strategy Consultants). 
8 Cliff Lui, Telecommunications Competition Regulation in Hong Kong 4 (2007), 
http://www.viperfusion.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/telecommunications
-competition-regulation-in-hk.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J3U-W4JL] (emphasis added). 
9 HANS-WERNER GOTTINGER, ECONOMIES OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 1, 4 (2003). 
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cycles of products are short, sunk cost is significant, innovation is 
essential. . . .”10  A reminiscence of the old legal monopolies may 
be that one company retains a particularly strong market position, 
which it might employ strategically to hurt competitors. Taking 
into account these peculiarities, it is perhaps unsurprising that, in a 
jurisdiction traditionally unswayed by the merits of exerting 
legislative control over anti-competitive behavior, there was an 
awareness that competition in telecommunications required 
exceptional legislative attention. Such special care came in the 
shape of both sector-specific regulation and sector-specific 
competition law provisions. The regulation-antitrust interplay is 
not uncommon in network industries, since it can be difficult to 
achieve competition by relying solely on market forces: what is 
efficient may not always socially desirable, and social and private 
benefits do not necessarily coincide.11 As a consequence, industry-
focused competition law provisions were seen as a necessary 
complement to the sectoral regulation that formed the backbone of 
a liberalization policy aimed at promoting competitive 
telecommunications markets. 
This paper assesses the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework set up to guarantee the protection of competition in the 
telecommunications sector in Hong Kong. Through various 
initiatives and reforms implemented in the past couple of decades, 
the markets have indeed been progressively liberalized, and with 
remarkable achievements. They are among the most competitive 
telecom markets in the world, with a high number of competitors, 
low market concentration ratios, impressive penetration rates, 
reasonable prices, and outstanding quality and reliability.12 Yet the 
enthusiasm over the results of the liberalization process may have 
served to eclipse important issues that could have, at least in part, 
been tackled through the development of a robust antitrust policy. 
It is often overlooked that competitiveness and market competition 
are two different issues: while the figures usually cited as a 
 
10 Id. at 1. 
11 Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, 
in THE NEW ECONOMY AND BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 96, 97 (Dennis W. 
Jansen ed., 2006). 
12 See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text; see also supra Section I.B. 
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testament to the achievements may be a good indicator of the 
former, they do not necessarily reflect accurately on the latter. 
Rivalry ought to put pressure on market players to compete, but it 
does not rule out the existence of market power—held either 
individually or collectively—with the potential to threaten the 
proper functioning of the market.13 And the fact remains that the 
profits that may be reaped from anti-competitive behavior are too 
tempting to be ignored. Unfortunately, when problems have been 
identified in Hong Kong, thus far the reaction of the relevant 
authorities has been disappointing at best, downright deficient at 
worst. In this context, the question arises as to whether the 
shortcomings have been a consequence of the existence of intrinsic 
limitations within the sector-specific competition provisions that 
were applicable to the industry until 2015, or if they can instead be 
attributed to a flawed enforcement policy. The present study 
reflects on the potential of the new cross-sector competition 
legislation to foster a more vigorous antitrust strategy. 
In order to explore these fundamental issues, the paper looks at 
the four principal telecoms markets: domestic and international 
fixed telephone network services, mobile telephony, and data 
(Internet) access. The second part provides an overview of the 
history of liberalization of the Hong Kong telecom industry and the 
results of the process on each of those markets. The third part 
covers the sector-specific legislative framework and its practical 
application. Thereafter, the fourth part considers the impact of the 
CO on the effectiveness of the protection of competition in the 
industry. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the fifth and final part. 
I. THE LIBERALIZATION OF HONG KONG’S TELECOMS MARKETS 
The narrative of the evolution of competition in the Hong Kong 
telecommunications sector is often presented as a major success 
story. According to the Office of the Communications Authority 
(“OFCA”), the executive arm of the current telecoms regulator, the 
region boasts “one of the most sophisticated and successful 
 
13 On the risks of market power, see Sandra Marco Colino, The Antitrust F Word: 
Fairness Considerations in Competition Law, J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
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telecommunications markets in the world,” a feature that has been 
crucial for its “development as a leading business and financial 
centre.”14 The most recent figures reflect a gross output of HKD 93 
billion for the industry, which employs over 20,000 people.15 The 
government frequently brags about the city’s position as “a leading 
market in terms of effectiveness of competition in 
telecommunications.”16 However, the conditions for competition to 
thrive did not exist until the telecoms markets were liberalized 
through a series of regulatory initiatives launched mainly in the 
1990s and 2000s. Liberalization was propelled by the convergence 
of two principal factors: first, the external pressure of global 
developments and the international obligations assumed by the 
government; second, an internal force, based on the growing 
conviction that heralding a competitive telecommunications 
industry was a must. The latter factor also led to the adoption of 
competition legislation, initially specific to telecommunications 
and eventually applicable to all sectors. This part of the paper 
focuses on the liberalization process. The implementation of 
competition law in the liberalized markets is addressed in the 
following part. 
A. How the Telecoms Markets Progressively Opened Up to 
Competition 
In 1994, the government ratified the Marrakesh Agreement, 
which established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).17 Hong 
Kong is thus a founding WTO member, and it was a party to the 
General Agreement on Trades and Services (“GATS”) when it 
entered into force in January 1995. The GATS constituted a 
multilateral effort to liberalize trade in services, including 
 
14 OFFICE OF THE COMMC’NS AUTH., TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2 (Dec. 2018), https://
www.ofca.gov.hk/filemanager/ofca/en/content_113/telecommunications.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TR9L-G2N9] [hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2018]. 
15 Id. 
16 Press Release, Office of the Telecommunications Authority, Study Finds Hong 
Kong a Competitive Telecommunications Market (June 20, 2003), http://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/brandhk/0620245.htm [https://perma.cc/2FGQ-KFD6]. 
17 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201867
/volume-1867-I-31874-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QDM-Z52Q]. 
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telecommunications.18 Annexed to the GATS in a Protocol was the 
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services 
(“BTSA”),19 to be implemented by 1998, by virtue of which the 
signatories committed to opening up their telecommunications 
services. The principal objective of the BTSA was to ensure 
reasonable, non-discriminatory access to telecommunications 
markets for service providers, equipment manufacturers, and 
vendors alike.20 In this context, Hong Kong was forced to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that any telecommunications markets 
that were not fully liberalized progressively opened up to 
competition. 
Already a year before signing the WTO Agreement, the Office 
of the Telecommunications Authority (“OFTA”) was set up as the 
executive arm of the former Hong Kong telecom watchdog, the 
Telecommunications Authority (“TA”).21 Vested with regulatory 
powers and entrusted with the task of enforcing competition in the 
telecommunications sector, the OFTA implemented and oversaw 
the liberalization process. Given that the TO, which has regulated 
the local telecom markets since 1963,22 requires a license to offer 
telecom services in Hong Kong,23 the first fundamental step 
towards liberalization necessarily had to imply awarding licenses 
to new operators. The first market in which liberalizing measures 
were implemented was that of local fixed telephone network 
 
18 Heidi Ullrich, Assessing the Interaction Between Multiple Levels of Rule-Making in 
Trade in Telecommunications Services, CSGR CIGI UNU-CRIS ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
(2005), https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/csgr-events
/conferences/2005_conferences/8_annual_conference/ulrich.doc [https://perma.cc/2ZSC-
52K8]. 
19 Laura B. Sherman, World Trade Organization: Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services), 36 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 354, 354 (1997). 
20 For a brief summary of the content of the BTSA, see M. Fredebeul-Krein & A. 
Freytag, Telecommunications and WTO Discipline. An assessment of the WTO 
Agreement on Telecommunication Services, 21 TELECOMM. POL’Y 447, 478–83 (1997). 
21 See About Us, OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk
/en/aboutOFTA/main.html [https://perma.cc/NUF6-VKXS] (last revised Feb. 19, 2010). 
22 Although the TO’s competition provisions have now been replaced by the CO, the 
rest of the TO remains in force. Compare Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 
106, § 8 (H.K.), with Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 (H.K.). 
23 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 8 (H.K.). 
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services (“FTNS”). The company Cable & Wireless Hong Kong 
Telecommunications Limited (which would later become HKT 
Limited, a subsidiary of PCCW since 2000) had a monopoly over 
the domestic sector until 1995. That year, the OFTA started issuing 
additional FTNS licenses. By 2003, the market was fully 
liberalized24 and as of 2018, there were twenty-seven fixed 
network operators providing local services.25 
External telecommunications took a little longer to open up. 
Hong Kong Telecom International (“HKTI”) was granted an 
exclusive license until 2006, which gave the company exclusive 
rights over fundamental external services, including voice 
telephony and international direct dial (“IDD”) calls.26 However, 
pressure was mounting on the Hong Kong government to honor the 
obligations it had assumed under the GATS and the BTSA. In 
addition, a 1991 study by Milton Mueller recommended ending 
HKTI’s privileges after showing that it was using the profits it 
made in the international services to cross-subsidize local calls.27 
Eventually, the government and HKTI agreed on the early 
termination of the exclusive rights. The international 
telecommunications services market was thus liberalized in 1999 
and a year later, the international circuits and facilities market 
followed suit.28 Currently, a plethora of international FTNS 
licensees operate through both cable and satellite. By 2016, there 
were 266 providers of external telecommunications services 
(“ETS”)29 and in 2017, the total capacity of external 
telecommunications facilities reached almost 53,000 Gigabits per 
 
24 Bus. Monitor Int’l, Hong Kong Telecommunications Report Q4 2011 88 (2011). 
25 Key Communications Statistics, OFF. COMM. AUTH., https://www.ofca.gov.hk
/en/media_focus/data_statistics/key_stat/index.html [https://perma.cc/AZ7H-KD2H] (last 
modified Jan. 16, 2019). 
26 IDDs are international calls which can be placed directly by dialling a country code. 
Liberalisation of Hong Kong’s External Telecommunications—A Policy Statement, 
ECON. SERVS. BUREAU, at 2 (Jan. 20, 1998), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/esb
/980120/pl120e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MHW-83QP]. 
27 See MILTON MUELLER, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HONG KONG: THE 
CASE FOR LIBERALIZATION 55, 94 (Chinese Univ. Press ed. 1992) (1991). 
28 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., supra note 7, at 14. 
29 Telecommunications, OFF. COMM. AUTH., at 2 (June 2016), 
https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/telecommunications.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5ZF-TMYC]. 
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second (“Gbps”). Market concentration is currently low in both the 
local and international fixed telephony sectors, and there is no 
dominant undertaking in either environment. 
The mobile telephony market has been fully liberalized since 
the government refrained from setting a cap on the number of 
licenses to be assigned or on the level of foreign investment.30 
Three licenses were issued as far back as 1984 with a another six 
personal communications services (“PCS”) licenses granted in 
1996.31 In 2001, third generation (“3G”) wireless mobile 
telecommunications technology licenses were allotted by the 
OFTA and subsequently the market opened up to fourth generation 
(“4G”) services, to the extent that it is now almost entirely 3G/4G 
enabled.32 By 2020, the fifth generation (“5G”) era is expected to 
begin. By 2021, further expansion is anticipated with the 
expiration of the fifteen-year licenses over certain spectrums.33 The 
government plans to re-assign around sixty percent of the spectrum 
through auction, and Chinese operators are expected to bid and 
possibly enter the market.34 There are currently four major mobile 
telephony operators serving 7.43 million people. As of December 
2017, the number of subscribers was around seventeen million 
with a penetration rate of 247.5 percent—among the highest in the 
world.35 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), which 
 
30 Arrangements for the Frequency Spectrum in the 1.9–2.2 GHz Band upon Expiry of 
the Existing Frequency Assignments for the Provision of 3G Mobile Services and the 
Spectrum Utilization Fee, OFF. OF COMM. AUTH., at 2 (Jan. 13, 2014), 
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/itb/papers/itb0113cb4-292-1-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KME6-W5LL]. 
31 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., supra note 7, at 9. PCS are defined as “[d]igital mobile 
service[s] which generally operate[] in the 1800–1900 MHz bands.” They rely on 
technology such Time Division Multiple Access (“TDMA”), Code Division Multiple 
Access (“CDMA”) and Global System for Mobile (“GSM”). Id. at 31. 
32 Office of the Telecomms. Auth., Report on the Effectiveness of Competition in 
Hong Kong’s Telecommunications Market in 2005: An International Comparison 24 
(Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2005), http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paper- 
guide/report/rp20051229.pdf [https://perma.cc/F23T-ZE4T]. 
33 DBS VICKERS (H.K.) LTD., HONG KONG TELECOM SECTOR 2 (Apr. 25, 2017) 
https://www.dbs.com/aics/pdfController.page?pdfpath=/content/article/pdf/AIO/042017/
170425_insights_cautious_on_hk_mobile_market.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8YL-9QML]. 
34 Id. at 3. 
35 See Arrangements for Assignment of the Spectrum in the 3.4–3.6 GHz Band for the 
Provision of Public Mobile Services and the Related Spectrum Utilisation Fee, COM. 
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measures market concentration by adding up the squared market 
shares of the various players, is among the lowest of developed 
economies,36 and no company holds a market share of more than 
thirty percent.37 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Hong Kong 
would have the “most affordable mobile and fixed telecom 
services” in the OECD.38 
With regard to data access, commercial Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) entered the market in 1993, only two years after 
the first Internet connection for the intra-city traffic, the Hong 
Kong Internet eXchange (“HKIX”) was established at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. At the time of writing, there were about 
250 ISPs39 operating in a city that boasts some of the region’s most 
sophisticated computer installations.40 Broadband is available in 
virtually all of the city’s residential and commercial buildings. Up 
to 2.64 million registered users—equivalent to ninety-two percent 
of households—have residential broadband connection with speeds 
of up to ten Gbps. However, there are just four principal providers 
of home broadband services. The incumbent PCCW-HKT holds as 
much as sixty percent of the market,41 and the only other 
competitor with a strong presence is Hong Kong Broadband 
Network (“HKBN”), with a market share of just over twenty-two 
percent.42 Besides broadband, the population may connect to the 
Internet through over ten thousand public wireless fidelity 
(“WiFi”) hotspots.43 Indeed, recent figures point to a high level of 
 
ECON. DEV. BUREAU & OFF. COMM. AUTH. (May 2, 2018), https://www.coms-
auth.hk/filemanager/en/content_711/cp20180502.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8TF-Q5C9]. 
36 Cheng, supra note 5, at 504. 
37 Id. 
38 YUN ZHAO, CYBER LAW IN HONG KONG 26 (2d ed. 2011). 
39 List of Internet Service Providers (ISP), OFF. OF COMM. AUTH., 
https://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/data_statistics/data_statistics/internet/list_of_internet_service
_providers [https://perma.cc/DDW8-R2KT] (last modified Feb. 1, 2019). 
40 ZHAO, supra note 38, at 26.  
41 Anthea Lai & Sam Cheung, Hong Kong’s Next Twenty Years, BLOOMBERG PROF’L 
SERVS.  fig.2 (June 9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/hong-kongs-
next-20-years-telecom [https://perma.cc/DEQ4-KE3B]. 
42 Hong Kong Telecom Sector, DBS VICKERS (H.K.) LTD., at 5 fig.4 (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.dbs.com/aics/templatedata/article/industry/data/en/GR/042016/telecommuni
cations_honglong.xml [https://perma.cc/3FKP-54SQ]. 
43 ZHAO, supra note 38, at 27. 
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mobile internet usage. Almost half of the population connects with 
their phones more frequently than their computers,44 and about 
seventy percent of the population is in possession of a 
smartphone.45 It should thus come as no surprise that research 
conducted by the Society for Consumer Research (“GfK”)46 shows 
that Hong Kong remains the world’s most connected place.47 This 
reputation is further enhanced by the growth of connecting 
wearables such as smart watches, described as the “in thing” of the 
late 2010s, and of connected cars.48 
B. The Regulatory Framework that Enabled Liberalization 
The above insights into the liberalization process of the 
principal telecoms markets show that, in order to open up regulated 
industries to competition, it is necessary to first do away with any 
existing limitations on the obtaining of licenses to provide the 
relevant services. To this end, since the 1990s, “[t]here is no pre-
set limit on the number of licenses issued [to operate in Hong 
Kong’s telecom markets], nor deadline for applications. 
Furthermore, there is no specific requirement on network rollout or 
investment. The level of investment is determined by the 
market.”49 Even then, the license system is not considered to be the 
 
44 See Dustin Sodano, Nearly Seven in 10 Hong Kong Residents Use Smartphones, 
EMARKETER (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Nearly-Seven-10-Hong-
Kong-Residents-Use-Smartphones/1014941 [https://perma.cc/2M3G-PAPD]. 
45 Id. 
46 The abbreviation derives from the German name of the Society, Gesellschaft für 
Konsumforschung. 
47 Jamie Carter, Hong Kong Still the World’s Most Connected Place; Singapore Not 
Even in Top 10, SO. CHINA MORNING POST (May 11, 2016), http://www.scmp.com
/lifestyle/article/1943505/hong-kong-still-worlds-most-connected-place-singapore-not-
even-top-10 [https://perma.cc/S3TK-VTP4]. The GfK applies the Connected Consumer 
Index (“CCI”), which considers “how much, and on what devices, consumers in each of 
78 countries and 8 world regions digitally connect with each other and with digital 
content.” See Claudia Spadoni, Connected Consumer Index, GFK, https://connected-
consumer.gfk.com/connected-consumer-index/?no_cache=1 [https://perma.cc/UM8Q-
VZ8X] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
48 See Press Release, GfK, Hong Kong, North America and UAE are World’s Most 
“Connected” Populations (May 10, 2016), https://www.gfk.com/insights/press-
release/hong-kong-north-america-and-uae-are-worlds-most-connected-populations 
[https://perma.cc/ZHX3-LMLW]. 
49 OFF. COMM. AUTH., supra note 14. 
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optimal framework in which to nurture competition. In 2003, the 
OFTA acknowledged that “competition is neither created nor 
fostered simply by the process of licensing new operators but by 
the ability of new entrants to access end-users and the extent to 
which the incumbent is able to constrain the development of 
competition.”50 Therefore, at a time when the adoption of antitrust 
legislation was not on the agenda, the government was aware that 
merely facilitating the issuance of licenses to newcomers would 
not suffice for the markets to work adequately. While such a 
strategy would remove the most significant barrier to entry (i.e. 
regulatory constraints), the market power held by the former 
monopolists would allow them to erect other barriers. The most 
common ways to do so would be either adopting a pricing strategy 
that makes it impossible for rivals to compete, or not allowing new 
entrants access to their network.51 
As a consequence of these concerns, in 1995, at the very outset 
of the liberalization process (and before the introduction of 
competition rules in the TO), basic operator-specific competition 
rules were inserted into the General Conditions (“GCs”) of the 
FTNS licenses issued to fixed line service providers.52 The GCs 
included relatively standard prohibitions of both anti-competitive 
conduct by non-dominant licensees (including collusion and 
tying)53 and abuses of dominance.54 But the licenses went further 
and effectively regulated the accounting55 and pricing policies56 of 
dominant firms. They would, inter alia, need to seek prior 
 
50 OFFICE OF THE TELECOMMUMINCATIONS AUTHORITY, supra note 7, at 5. 
51 One of the allegations most frequently met by monopolists is that “in order to 
protect a profitable position, [they] may erect barriers that prevent new entrants coming 
into the market . . . .” SANDRA MARCO COLINO, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK 
303 (8th ed. 2019). 
52 Directions Issued Under Licenses–FTNS/Fixed Carrier Licenses, OFF. TELECOMM. 
AUTH., http://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/ta-directions/ta-directions-ftns.html  [https://
perma.cc/34L7-R4AY] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (archiving the relevant FTNS licenses); 
see also Cheng, supra note 5, at 505. 
53 Cheng, supra note 5, at 505; see also, Lui, supra note 8, at 9.  
54 Cheng, supra note 5, at 505. 
55 See, e.g., Telecomm. Auth. Direction to H.K. Tel. Co., DR-07/1995 (June 29, 1995), 
https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/ta-directions/ta-directions-ftns.html [https://perma.cc
/96CY-CG7B] (exemplifying operation of GC 17). 
56 Cheng, supra note 5, at 505. 
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approval to implement discounts, which would otherwise be 
prohibited.57 The aim of such a rule was precisely that former 
monopolists would not be able to prevent market entry by setting 
prices at a level that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
newcomers to flourish.58 Dominant companies would also be 
precluded from giving and receiving unfair advantages to and from 
associates, so as to ensure that providers needing to use networks 
controlled by the former monopolists would have access to these 
on the same conditions as their affiliates, without experiencing 
exclusionary discrimination.59 There provisions were fundamental 
since, as Cliff Lui has noted, “[w]ithout the force of law or 
authority, the incumbent would have used all resources necessary 
to eradicate new competing firms fighting for pieces of its profits 
pie.”60 Licensees holding a dominant position, which felt that their 
dominance had all but vanished, could request a review of their 
classification.61 If successful, they would no longer have to comply 
with the specific obligations attached to dominance. 
These rules constitute the first attempt to introduce boundaries 
on the freedom of market operators in order to protect competition 
in Hong Kong. It is interesting that, in a jurisdiction so reluctant to 
the adoption of antitrust legislation, the restrictions imposed on 
dominant undertakings in the GCs are significantly harsher than 
those that would normally be imposed under modern competition 
law systems. They respond to the rationale that the market power 
of dominant players in previously regulated network industries 
 
57 Cheng, supra note 5, at 505; see also, Lui, supra note 8, at 9.  
58 Ling Ping & Edward Chen, Competition Policy Under Laissez-faireism: Market 
Power and Its Treatment in Hong Kong, 21 REV. INDUS. ORG. 145, 148, 150 (2002). 
59 For an analysis of the extent to which exclusionary discrimination should be 
considered abusive and unlawful, see Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Exclusionary Discrimination 
under Article 102 TFEU, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 141 (2014). 
60 Lui, supra note 8, at 8. 
61 GC 44. See, e.g., Gracie Foo, Direction Issued under Fixed Telecommunications 
Network Services License General Condition 44 to H.K. Cable Television Ltd., DR-
48/2004, TELECOMM. AUTH. (Aug. 20, 2004), https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/ta-
directions/dir20040820.pdf https://perma.cc/LQW4-E2VQ (exemplifying operation of 
GC 44). 
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needs to be not just controlled, but actively undermined.62 In the 
Guidelines to Assist the Interpretation and Application of the 
Competition Provisions of the FTNS License, issued by the OFTA 
in 1995,63 it seems that the government attempts to downplay the 
relevance and intrusiveness of the rules, specifying that the GCs 
were to be interpreted as a standard of conduct and not as 
comprehensive competition or consumer protection regulation. 
However, it is evident that they follow the logic of modern 
antitrust regimes. This suggests that the awareness of the pressing 
need to regulate competition existed even in the 1990s, despite the 
assiduous denial of its significance in other sectors. Unfortunately, 
the GCs were not just specific to the telecoms industry, but 
addressed to particular licensees only. Their scope was thus 
extremely limited. 
C. The Shortcomings of Fostering Competition  
Through Regulation 
In view of the impact of liberalization on Hong Kong’s 
telecoms markets, explored above,64 it is understandable that the 
government would take pride in the achievements of the process. It 
has not been shy to take credit for its role in fostering competitive 
market structures. By way of example, in 2003, when commenting 
on the swift expansion of the new entrants, an OFTA spokesperson 
was quoted as saying that it was “the result of our liberalization 
policy and pro-competition regulations.”65 In addition to the 
growth of new market players, additional achievements are 
frequently cited to illustrate just how competitive the telecoms 
industry is. Penetration rates are among the highest in the world, 
 
62 Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, EU Competition Law in the Regulated Network Industries, in 
INTERSECTIONS OF ANTITRUST: POLICY AND REGULATION (Jonathan Galloway ed., 
forthcoming 2019). 
63 Guidelines to Assist the Interpretation and Application of the Competition 
Provisions of the FTNS Licence, GN-01/1995, OFF. TELECOM. AUTH. (June 1995), https://
tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/report-paper-guide/guidance-notes/in95f211.html 
[https://perma.cc/NT8A-NHFM]. 
64 See supra Section I.A. 
65 Press Release, H.K. Gov’t, Study Finds Hong Kong a Competitive 
Telecommunications Market (June 20, 2003), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general
/brandhk/0620245.htm [https://perma.cc/BJG7-4EC4] (emphasis added). 
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and its telecoms markets are among the least expensive. Between 
1996 and 2002, the cumulative savings from competition in mobile 
telephony were calculated to be HKD 70 billion, while customer 
savings from IDD calls from 1999 to 2001 were estimated to be 
around HKD 31 billion.66 Scholars have seconded the merits of the 
government’s strategy. Yun Zhao, for instance, finds that the 
process led to “open and effective competition, voluntary and 
industry-led standards and wide consumer choices.”67 
Significantly, the success is often attributed to Hong Kong’s 
minimalist approach to regulation and the predominant belief that 
market forces (virtually) alone are the optimal way of allocating 
resources.68 As a consequence, the assumption has been that, once 
the markets were opened up, competition flourished, and there was 
little or no need to take any further action. 
The view that the achievements referred to above are 
necessarily a reflection of healthy competition is nonetheless 
imprecise. As the Hong Kong Consumer Council has noted, there 
appears to be a conflation of the concept of international 
competitiveness with that of domestic competition,69 when they are 
in fact not equivalent. International competitiveness is a fairly 
broad concept that is frequently referred to but seldom defined.70 It 
refers generally to the ability of a country’s firms to compete in 
export markets, or against imports in their domestic market.71 
According to a 1985 House of Lords Report, 
[a] firm is competitive if it can produce products 
and services of superior quality and lower costs than 
its domestic and international competitors. 
Competitiveness is synonymous with a firm’s long-
 
66 Id. 
67 ZHAO, supra note 38, at 26. 
68 Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 145. 
69 CONSUMER COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY: THE KEY TO HONG KONG’S FUTURE 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS ¶ 3.5 (1996), https://www.consumer.org.hk/sites/consumer
/files/competition_issues/199611/competitionpolicy_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV84-
JFSY] [hereinafter COMPETITION POLICY]. 
70 Jan Fagerberg, International Competitiveness, 98 ECON. J., 355, 355 (1998). 
71 Nick Godfrey, Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?, 7 
OECD GLOB. FORUM ON INT’L INV. 1, 5 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment
/globalforum/40315399.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ9M-2G3R]. 
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run profit performance and its ability to compensate 
its employees and provide superior returns to its 
owners.72 
Whether a region is competitive is calculated, inter alia, with 
reference to a mix of macroeconomic, microeconomic, structural, 
and qualitative aspects ranging from gross domestic product (GDP) 
to the openness of domestic markets and the rule of law.73 
Domestic competition, on its part, is a crucial factor for 
competitiveness.74 It is measured by issues such as the size of firms 
in the markets, product substitutability, market contestability, the 
existence of barriers to entry, and consumer welfare.75 As Ping and 
Chen have highlighted, “[w]hile Hong Kong is truly competitive in 
international markets in terms of exports and the ability to attract 
foreign investment, this competitiveness does not mean, nor does it 
ensure, that competition exists among firms in domestic 
markets.”76 
In this sense, Hong Kong may have been a victim of its own 
success, and the acceptable levels of competitiveness may have 
eclipsed the resilient obstacles that dampen competition in its 
domestic telecoms markets. Even more importantly, the 
assumptions made about the operation of Hong Kong’s 
telecommunications markets appear to obviate the basic premise 
that a specific market structure is not always a valid indicator of 
the level of competition in that market. Competition is not an end 
in itself, but a means to achieve other goals, including efficiency. 
A monopolistic market structure is certainly inferior to a model of 
perfect competition.77 Yet even in the absence of concentration, the 
 
72 SELECT COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS TRADE, REPORT, 1984-85, HL 238-I, at 468 (UK). 
73 CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 23; see also Peter J. Buckley, Christopher L. 
Pass & Kate Prescott, Measures of International Competitiveness: A Critical Survey, 4 J. 
OF MKTG. MGMT. 175–200 (1988). 
74 Issue Note, UNCTAD Secretariat, The Relationship Between Competition, 
Competitiveness and Development, U.N. Issue Note TD/B/COM.2/CLP/30, at 4 (May 
23, 2002) http://unctad.org/Sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb0020_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7PPW-37LZ]; see also Godfrey, supra note 71, at 5. 
75 CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 23. 
76 Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 146. 
77 MICHAEL E. WETZSTEIN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: CONCEPTS AND CONNECTIONS 
488 (2d ed. 2013). 
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behavior of the participants may stifle the process that antitrust 
laws were designed to protect. The link between perfect and actual 
competition was an idea defended by Neoclassical economics,78 
but more recent, elaborate theories and extensive evidence show 
that placing the focus of antitrust intervention solely on market 
structure is not sufficient. While some market structures lend 
themselves to anti-competitive behavior, and require special 
attention, it is possible that firms behave anti-competitively in 
virtually every market scenario. Market competition should instead 
be understood as a dynamic process affected by multiple factors, 
one of which is the configuration of the market.79 
As a consequence of the above, while the structure of Hong 
Kong’s main telecommunications markets (with the notable 
exception of data access) is healthy, this does not imply that those 
markets are free from all ills, nor that competition is necessarily 
stark. The existence of a desirable market structure is not enough 
to guarantee competition, as demonstrated by some of the issues 
that have come to light post-liberalization, discussed in the next 
section.80 The regulatory changes that opened up the markets and 
put pressure on the incumbents to compete fairly managed to level 
the playing field, but that field needs to be adequately cared for to 
reap the expected fruits of strong competition. For this purpose, the 
adoption of antitrust legislation is paramount. 
 
78 See, e.g., AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
THE THEORY OF WEALTH (A.M. Kelley Publishers 1838). For an overview of Neoclassical 
economics, see Tony Lawson, What is This ‘School’ Called Neoclassical Economics?, 37 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 947, 947 (2013). 
79 See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921). 
For an analysis from a Hong Kong perspective, see generally KUI-WAI LI, ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM: LESSONS FOR HONG KONG (2012). 
80 See infra Section III.C. 
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II. THE BOUNDARIES OF SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMPETITION LAW 
A. The Consumer Council’s (Unheeded) Efforts to Spur the 
Adoption of Competition Law 
Competition has long been considered “instrumental to the 
rapid development of the local telecom market.”81 Giving 
customers a choice of service providers, it was believed, would  
encourage competing firms to act more efficiently, reduce prices, 
enhance innovation, and improve service quality.82 Coinciding 
with the time when the seed of the liberalization process was 
planted, and despite the prevailing partiality towards laissez-
faireism, the debate as to whether competition law should be 
adopted in Hong Kong was gaining momentum. In 1992, Chris 
Patten, the last British Governor of Hong Kong, insisted that both 
the Consumer Council and the Legislative Council (LegCo) ought 
to help the government to “defend free markets and to give 
consumers the full redress against unscrupulous business practices 
to which they are entitled.”83 
Indeed, the Hong Kong Consumer Council was instrumental in 
shedding light on the problems related to the lack of competition in 
Hong Kong’s markets and in putting pressure on the government to 
take action. In the early 1990s, it conducted a series of studies—
one of which focused on telecommunications—which showed the 
poor intensity of competition in various sectors of the local 
economy.84 In 1996, it published the report “Competition Policy: 
The Key to Hong Kong’s Future Success” (the 1996 Report).85 
Inter alia, it highlighted that Hong Kong’s strong performance 
could not be taken for granted, since growing international 
pressure increasingly threatened its competitive edge.86 It also 
found that maintaining a monopoly on international calls as a 
 
81 Lui, supra note 8, at 4.  
82 Id. 
83 Official Record of Proceedings, H.K. LEG. COUNCIL 16 (Oct. 7, 1992), 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr92-93/english/lc_sitg/hansard/h921007.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/8A34-XKBK]. 
84 CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 9. 
85 See generally CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69. 
86 Id. at 73. 
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consequence of HKTI’s exclusive license (which would be 
revoked three years later) was contradictory with the general trend 
of opening up the markets.87 By the time the 1996 Report was 
published, services had overtaken manufacturing to become the 
major economic activity of the city, and the export of services was 
viewed as fundamental for the economic growth of Hong Kong.88 
While the government, already committed to liberalizing the 
industry, had vowed to ensure that service markets remain open 
and highly competitive, the absence of intervention would not 
work for all markets. In particular, in the case of utilities, 
international competition was hampered by the fact that they were 
provided locally. The main conclusion was that “Hong Kong must 
map out a pragmatic development strategy in which a 
comprehensive competition policy should play a vital part.”89 The 
Consumer Council ultimately advocated for the adoption of cross-
sector comprehensive competition legislation and the creation of 
an authority with the power to investigate potential breaches of the 
law.90 
The government’s reaction to the study came only a year after 
the publication of the 1996 Report, in the shape of the creation of a 
Competition Policy Advisory Group (“COMPAG”) to assess the 
recommendations put forward by the Consumer Council.91  Rather 
disappointingly, in May 1998, the COMPAG issued a formal 
policy statement saying that, rather than introducing a general 
competition law, the government would opt for continuing to focus 
on sector-specific competition policy.92 A general ban on anti-
competitive practices, according to the COMPAG, would be an 
“overkill,” and the creation of an antitrust agency would only lead 
to the duplication of regulatory bodies.93 The COMPAG further 
claimed that cross-sector competition law would not deal with the 
peculiarities of each industry.94 As a consequence, it announced 
 
87 See supra Section I.A. 
88 CONSUMER COUNCIL, supra note 69, at 1. 
89 Id. at 73. 
90 Id. at 75. 
91 Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 148. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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that different rules for different sectors would be enacted, to be 
enforced by sector-specific bodies.95 This was the context in which 
competition provisions were added to the TO and included in the 
BO when it was enacted. Unfortunately, until 2015, they remained 
the only two sectors vested with antitrust rules. While this 
development dealt a blow to the proposals of the Consumer 
Council, and to those advocating for competition law in Hong 
Kong, it was an important step forward in the path towards the 
adoption of cross-sector legislation. 
B. The Substantive Provisions of the  
Telecommunications Ordinance 
The TO’s main substantive antitrust provisions, applicable to 
telecoms licensees, came into force in June 2000 in the shape of 
Sections 7I to 7N.96 They were accompanied by new procedural 
rules so as to enable their enforcement: Sections 32N to 32R dealt 
with appeals,97 Section 35A conferred on the TA investigatory 
powers,98 and Section 36C contained the relevant penalties.99 
Mergers in the sector remained free from scrutiny until July 2004, 
when Section 7P, introduced by the Telecoms (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2003, became applicable. 
Essentially, the provisions added to the TO did little else than 
extend to the entire telecoms industry the rules contained in the 
GCs of the FTNS licenses, discussed in the previous section.100 
Anticompetitive joint conduct was covered in Section 7K, which 
prohibited licensees in telecoms markets from engaging in conduct 
with “the purpose or effect of preventing or substantially 
restricting competition.”101 The second paragraph of the provision 
contained a non-exhaustive list of the circumstances that would be 
taken into account when assessing the legality of a conduct. It 
included the ubiquitous references to price fixing, refusals to 
 
95 Id. 
96 See Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7I-N (H.K.). 
97 See id. at §32. 
98 See id. at §35. 
99 See id. at §36. 
100 See supra Section I.B. 
101 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.). 
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supply competitors, and market sharing arrangements, plus a 
general clause allowing the assessment of the conditions of the 
relevant licenses.102 Section 7K(3) specified the kind of conduct 
that would be forbidden, mentioning three categories: any 
“agreement, arrangement or understanding” with an 
anticompetitive purpose or effect; exclusive agreements imposing 
obligations not to acquire from others;103 and giving or receiving 
unfair advantages to or from associates, to the detriment of 
competitors.104 This last category was invoked in the 2003 Banyan 
Garden Estate case, discussed below.105 
Section 7L forbids the abuse of dominance on the part of 
telecoms licensees.106 A rather loose definition of what constitutes 
a dominant position can be found in the second paragraph of the 
prohibition, which is described as the ability of a licensee to act 
“without significant competitive restraint from its competitors and 
customers.”107 Whether a company is dominant is to be determined 
by considering, inter alia, the licensee’s market share, its power to 
make pricing decisions, the existence of barriers to entry in the 
market, and the degree of product differentiation.108 Abuse was 
defined as “conduct which has the purpose or effect of preventing 
or substantially restricting competition in a telecommunications 
market.”109 Specific forms of abuse would include predatory 
pricing, price discrimination (that is, price differences that are not 
justified by actual or likely differences in the supply costs), the 
imposition of harsh contractual terms or terms unrelated to the 
subject of the contract, tying arrangements, and discrimination in 
the supply of services to competitors.110 Section 7N refers to 
various forms of discrimination that will be considered abusive 
when carried out by a dominant licensee,111 but only where the TA 
 
102 Id. at § 7K(2). 
103 Unless the TA has given written authorization for such an arrangement. 
104 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(3) (H.K.). 
105 See infra Section II.C. 
106 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7L(1) (H.K.). 
107 Id. at § 7L(2). 
108 Id. at § 7L(3). 
109 Id. at § 7L(4). 
110 Id. at § 7L(5). 
111 Id. at § 7N(1), (2). 
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finds that there is an anticompetitive purpose or effect.112 
Discrimination, in the context of the application of the TO, can be 
in relation to charges (unless they reflect cost), performance 
characteristics, or other terms or conditions of supply.113 
By virtue of Section 7P of the TO, the TA also had the power 
to oversee mergers affecting carrier licenses. The test adopted was 
whether the merger would tend to substantially lessen competition 
(“SLC”),114 employed in jurisdictions such as the UK, US, or other 
parts of the world.115 Like in UK merger control, notification was 
not compulsory under the TO, but consent could be sought by the 
affected licensee or any interested person.116 Regardless of whether 
a merger had been notified, in the event that the TA believed that 
an SLC could occur, it had the power to issue a written notice 
asking the licensee to take such action as it considered necessary 
“to eliminate or avoid any such effect.”117 An exception was 
provided for those concentrations which could result in efficiencies 
that would outweigh any potential detrimental consequences.118 
After considering the concentration and giving the interested 
parties a reasonable opportunity to make representations,119 if the 
concerns still persisted and no countervailing efficiencies were 
identified, the TA could refuse consent or make consent 
conditional upon the adoption of specified remedies targeted at 
eliminating the SLC. 
 
112 Id. at § 7N(4). 
113 Id. at § 7N(3). 
114 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 106, §7P(1)(a) (H.K.). 
115 See Thomas O. Barnett, Substantial Lessening of Competition—the Section 7 
Standard, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 293, 296 (2005) (discussing the SLC test, inter alia); 
Ioannis Kokkoris, Do Merger Stimulation and Critical Loss Analysis Differ under the 
SLC and Dominance Test?, 27 EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. REV. 249, 250 (2005). 
116 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.); 
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 106, §7P(6) (H.K.). 
117 Id. at § 7P(1)(b). 
118 Id. 
119 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.); 
Telecommunications Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 106, §7P(3) (H.K.). 
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C. The Limitations of the Sectoral Antitrust System 
In principle, if adequately enforced, the scope of the TO’s 
antitrust and merger review clauses would have been apt for 
attacking a wide range of anti-competitive practices and for 
preventing concentrations that could pose a threat to competition. 
Their effectiveness would have been limited to telecoms markets, 
yet within those sectoral boundaries, they could have been used to 
protect the hard-earned competitive environment in the sector. A 
robust industry-specific competition policy could also have served 
to showcase the benefits of applying antitrust to combat anti-
competitive conduct, which could have proved crucial at a time of 
prevailing skepticism towards such regulation. Regrettably, 
important procedural and practical limitations, discussed here, 
drastically reduced the significance of the regime. 
The penalties for breaches of the competition law provisions 
are disappointing for a number of reasons. First, most cases were 
resolved with a mere warning letter or a direction, which would in 
effect amount to nothing more than a cease-and-desist order 
requiring the companies in breach of the rules to put an end to the 
alleged violation. Such lax consequences would hardly have had 
any deterrent effect, and they would not be sufficient to restore 
competition and/or fix the damage caused by anticompetitive 
behavior. While financial penalties were contemplated in the TO, 
they were reserved for serious breaches and were usually capped at 
a modest HKD 200,000 for first-time wrongdoers, which could be 
increased up to a maximum of HKD 1 million in the event of 
recidivism.120 As the author has argued elsewhere, a fixed 
maximum penalty does not affect all companies equally, and the 
excessive predictability invites strategic behavior as to whether it 
is profitable to breach the law.121 Moreover, the TO’s fixed fines 
were too low to be threatening to those “making substantial profits 
from cartel activity.”122 Harsher fines based on turnover and 
sanctions such as the suspension of the license were reserved for 
 
120 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 36C(3) (H.K.). 
121 MARCO COLINO, supra note 51, at 135–37. 
122 Sandra Marco Colino, Punishing Cartel Conduct: Means to Encourage Compliance 
with the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance, in CARTELS IN ASIA: LAW AND PRACTICE 
315–32 (T. Cheng, S. Marco Colino & B. Ong eds., 2015). 
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the most serious breaches and never applied in practice.123 A 
second issue was the late adoption of merger control. No merger 
was ever blocked, and the scarce analysis of the concentrations that 
took place before the entry into force of the CO would not have 
been sufficient to effectively identify anticompetitive harm.124 
Third, the Consumer Council and commentators insisted on the 
weaknesses intrinsic to the nature of the sectoral approach. 
According to the Consumer Council, the resulting approach would 
be “piece meal” and could lead to inconsistencies if the different 
regulators reached different outcomes in similar investigations. 
Moreover, contrary to the government’s claims, Lin and Chen 
argued that it would be inadequate to have regulatory bodies take 
on the additional role of antitrust enforcers, as this would require 
them to perform dual roles and would force them to judge 
complaints relating to the companies they themselves regulated. 
They further insisted on the potential negative consequences of the 
rules “on the efficient allocation of resources across different 
sectors of the economy,” given that private actors’ investment 
decisions take into account the “institutional costs” of being active 
in specific markets.125 
Fourth, beyond the limitations of the law, an even more 
significant obstacle for the effectiveness of the sector-specific 
competition law provisions was the absence of enforcement 
initiative on the part of the TA to take action against 
anticompetitive conduct. In 2002, Lin and Chen assessed the cases 
completed by the TA, in which the GCs of the FTNS licenses 
and/or the TO had come into play.126 In the very few examples that 
had arisen, the TA had seldom acted on its own volition and 
mainly limited himself to acting “as a referee in resolving 
complaints” from consumers, competitors, or the Consumer 
Council.127 As outsiders to the allegedly illegal activity, it was 
often difficult for those parties to meet the standard of proof 
 
123 Telecommunications Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 106, § 7K(1) (H.K.).  
124 Ping & Chen, supra note 58, at 150. 
125 Id. at 156–57. 
126 Id. at 152–53. 
127 Id. at 161. 
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required to show that an infringement had taken place.128 
Moreover, the lack of competition culture in the city made it 
difficult for victims of anti-competitive conduct to identify the 
illegality of the actions that could be affecting them in their daily 
lives and having a significant impact on their welfare.129 
The passive role of the TA was perhaps most noticeable when 
it came to tackling the most significant suspected violations of the 
sector-specific competition rules, with three particularly notorious 
examples. The first was a case of price fixing between 
competitors.130 In January 2000 (only months prior to the entry 
into force of the competition law provisions of the TA), all 
licensed mobile telephone operators individually announced a 
twenty to twenty-five percent price increase in the subscription 
fees for all of their major service plans, which would take effect on 
the same day.131 Contrary to what the GCs of their licenses 
required, the TA had not been notified of the price increase in 
advance.132 According to the service providers, their actions did 
not amount to collusion, as they were simply attempting to make 
up for the losses they had been experiencing since 1999.133 They 
did admit, however, that representatives from their companies had 
met to discuss common concerns in the months immediately before 
the price hike, and they did touch upon the issue of passing the 
license fee to customers.134 While the TA came to the conclusion 
that “some kind of arrangement between the companies with 
regard to their prices must have existed,” no penalties were 
imposed, given that they all agreed to modify their conduct to 
ensure that they complied with their obligations.135 The lenient 
response to what is generally accepted to be the most harmful kind 
of anticompetitive conduct was highly unsatisfactory and would in 
no way have served to deter collusive practices.136 
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The second case was the implementation of what may possibly 
have amounted to abusive bundling in Banyan Garden Estate, 
decided in 2003.137 Bayan Garden Estate is a housing complex in 
the city’s Kowloon district, developed by Cheung Kong (Holdings) 
Limited (CKH).138 Its residents complained that Citybase, the 
estate’s management company, had included in the (compulsory) 
monthly management fee the cost of telephone and Internet 
services to be provided by Hutchison Multimedia, HGCL, and 
PowerCom—all subsidiaries of the property developer, who also 
owned Citybase.139 Resorting to the services of an alternative 
operator would have led to payment in addition to the management 
fee.140 The case was brought before the TA, citing an advantage 
given to affiliates that violated Section 7K(3)(c) TO by restricting 
the residents’ freedom to resort to alternative operators.141 Citybase 
claimed that there had been a bidding process for the provision of 
the Internet services,142 as a consequence of which the providers 
had been selected. The TA concluded that this process was not 
unfair (a requirement for the provision at stake to be applicable), 
since the favored telecoms operators “had no apparent knowledge 
that they were being advantaged, and had either acted 
competitively for the right to be selected or were recommended by 
an unrelated third party.”143 The focus of the analysis of these 
practices is entirely flawed. As Cheng has noted, the economic 
impact was completely overlooked, and the intention and actual 
harm were not taken into consideration.144 The lack of jurisdiction 
on the part of the TA to scrutinize the real estate market precluded 
a full analysis of the possibly unlawful bundling.145 
 
137 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., COMPLAINTS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROVISION OF 
TELEPHONE AND INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES AT BANYAN GARDEN ESTATE 1 (2004), 
https://tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/c_bd/completed-cases/t261_03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BRA-HV5E]. 
138 Id. at 3. 
139 Id. at 4, 14. 
140 Id. at 1. 
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145 Id. at 523–24. 
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The problems in the residential broadband market endured. In 
May 2007, the OFTA published the results of a survey it conducted 
on consumer satisfaction with home broadband services, after 
receiving over 4,000 complaints.146 The survey reflected that sixty-
two percent of respondents had experienced problems with their 
service in the previous 12 months.147 They cited reliability, 
connection speed, and customer services as the most significant 
issues.148 In its statement, the OFTA placed the emphasis on the 
need for greater transparency and consumer information.149 No 
mention was made of the possible link between these issues and 
the level of competition in the market.150 Many customers, for 
instance, did not have a choice, not as a result of a lack of 
information, but because their properties had been fitted with the 
infrastructure to connect to only one residential broadband 
provider that was owned by the property developer.151 This once 
again reflects the insufficiencies of the industry-specific legislation 
in a city dominated by tycoons who control powerful 
conglomerates in multiple sectors of the economy. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ADOPTION OF CROSS-SECTOR 
COMPETITION ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
By the late 2000s, Hong Kong’s resistance to cross-sector 
competition law had become an anachronism. In 2008, there were 
 
146 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., PANEL ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BROADCASTING 
4 (Mar. 10, 2008), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/panels/itb/papers
/itb0630cb1-2017-5-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G9F-MEMR]; Survey on Residential 
Broadband Internet Services, OFFICE OF THE TELECOMM. AUTH. (Jan. 2007), http://
tel_archives.ofca.gov.hk/en/press_rel/2007/May_2007_r1.html [https://perma.cc/4AZV-
Z4YR] [hereinafter OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., Survey on Residential Broadband Internet 
Services]; J. BACON-SHONE, SURVEY REPORT OF TELEPHONY SURVEY IN STAGE I ON 
BROADBAND CONSUMER SURVEY IN HONG KONG (Jan. 2007), https://tel_archives
.ofca.gov.hk/en/tas/others/ta20070502a.pdf. 
147 OFF. TELECOMM. AUTH., Survey on Residential Broadband Internet Services, supra 
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already 111 competition law regimes in the world.152 China’s first 
antitrust legislation, the Anti-Monopoly Law, came into force in 
August that year, marking the “symbolic commencement of a new 
era of competition for China.”153 Yet, in Hong Kong, the 
Consumer Council’s efforts remained unheeded during the 
mandate of Chee-hwa Tung, the first Chief Executive after the 
Handover,154 who was well connected to the local tycoons.155 It 
was in 2005, when Donald Tsang became Chief Executive, that 
things took a sharp turn. Convinced of the virtues of introducing 
antitrust legislation, he set up the Competition Policy Review 
Committee (“CPRC”), which presented the Competition Bill in 
July 2010.156 
While it was initially met with strong opposition, on June 14, 
2012, the CO was finally adopted by LegCo,157 and it entered into 
force on December 14, 2015.158 During the implementation period, 
the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) and the Hong 
Kong Competition Tribunal (“HKCT”) were set up, six guidelines 
were adopted, and two policy documents—one on leniency and 
one on enforcement priorities—were published.159 The HKCC also 
developed multiple competition advocacy initiatives, with a view 
to educating the population about the harms of anticompetitive 
conduct and to furnishing businesses with compliance 
 
152 ANESTIS S. PAPADOPOULOS, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY 15 (2007). 
153 Angela Zhang, The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An 
Institutional Design Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 630 (2011). 
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Y.S. Cheng ed. 2007). 
155 Sandra Marco Colino, Distribution Agreements under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
and the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance, 1 CHINA ANTITRUST L. J. 22 (2017). 
156 See THOMAS CHENG, CARTELS IN ASIA: LAW AND PRACTICE 295–314 (Thomas 
Cheng, Sandra Marco Colino & Burton Ong eds., 2015). 
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_guidance/legislation/overview.html [https://perma.cc/9M29-R5EY] (last visited Feb. 22, 
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information.160 In 2012, the TA and the OFTA were abolished, and 
their functions were assumed by the Communications Authority 
(“CA”) and the Office of the Communications Authority 
(“OFCA”).161 This section covers the CO’s most important 
features and explores its potential to control anticompetitive 
practices in general, and in the telecommunications industry in 
particular. 
A. The Shape of the Antitrust Regime Laid Down in the 
Competition Ordinance 
The CO’s main substantive rules are in keeping with the 
general principles of modern competition law regimes. They 
include: a prohibition of joint conduct, which may have an 
anticompetitive object or effect, enshrined in the First Conduct 
Rule (“FCR”); a condemnation of abuses of market power, in the 
shape of the Second Conduct Rule (“SCR”); and a Merger Rule, 
which aims to control concentrations involving telecoms carrier 
license holders that substantially lessen competition in Hong 
Kong.162 
The FCR applies to agreements, decisions by associations, or 
concerted practices between undertakings with the object or effect 
of preventing, distorting, or restricting competition in Hong 
Kong.163 Its wording is thus very similar to that of Article 101(1) 
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
and evidences that the European Union (“EU”) system was one of 
the regimes on which the CO was modelled.164 The Guideline on 
the First Conduct Rule (“Guideline FCR”), published by the 
HKCC in July 2015,165 specified that both horizontal and vertical 
 
160 Role & Functions, COMPETITION COMMISSION, https://www.compcomm.hk/en/about
/comm/role_functions.html [https://perma.cc/Q5JB-ZDJP] (last visited Feb 22, 2019). 
161 OFF. COMM. AUTH., supra note 29, at 1. 
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164 On the influence of international regimes on the CO, see id. at 544. 
165 Guideline on the First Conduct Rule, COMPETITION COMM’N (July 27, 2015), 
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agreements may be caught.166 Schedule 1 CO contains some 
exclusions and exemptions.167 It excludes agreements that enhance 
“overall economic efficiency” and some of the conduct that may be 
carried out by small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”).168 
Moreover, it contains what is in effect a De Minimis rule for 
agreements of “lesser significance,” by virtue of which the FCR 
will not apply to arrangements where the combined turnover of the 
undertakings does not exceed HKD 200 million, unless the 
behavior constitutes serious anti-competitive conduct.169 This is 
different from the EU De Minimis rule, which, rather than using a 
fixed amount, excludes agreements that do not meet certain market 
share thresholds, and is inapplicable in the case of restrictions of 
competition by object.170 The only exception to the Hong Kong 
exclusion is for serious anti-competitive conduct, a more limited 
concept: not all restrictions by object will fall under this rubric.171 
The conduct of powerful undertakings is controlled by the 
SCR, which forbids abuses of a substantial degree of market power 
(thereby seemingly adopting the standard of Australian and New 
Zealand competition law, rather than the dominance requirement 
of the EU).172 The HKCC considers market power to exist where 
an undertaking is able “profitably to raise prices above the 
competitive level for a sustained period.”173 With regard to what is 
considered abusive conduct, Section 21 CO refers to predatory 
behavior and to “limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers,” which is said to 
include “anti-competitive tying and bundling, refusals to deal and 
exclusive dealing.”174 Unlike the EU or US regimes, which do not 
 
166 Id. at 72. 
167 Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619, Sched. 1 (H.K.). 
168 Id. at §1. 
169 Id. at §5(1).  
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172 Kwok, supra note 163, at 551. 
173 COMPETITION COMM’N, GUIDELINE ON THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE ¶ 1.7, at 3 
(2015), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct
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contemplate exceptions in the case of abuses, the CO refers to 
various exclusions, including for services of general economic 
interest and for conduct of lesser significance, applicable to 
undertakings with an annual turnover of HKD forty million or 
less.175 It is unusual to have a De Minimis rule for these practices, 
and the adequacy of its inclusion in the CO has been questioned.176 
Breaches of the FCR and the SCR can be sanctioned in various 
ways, the most common of which is financial penalties of up to ten 
percent of an undertaking’s local turnover for each year of 
infringement, for up to a maximum of three years (which would be 
the three years with the highest turnovers if the violation lasted 
longer).177 The choice of local (as opposed to global) turnover and 
the three year cap respond to compromises that had to be made to 
get sufficient support in LegCo for the law to be passed.178 
Directors can also be disqualified for up to five years,179 provided 
that the illegal conduct “makes the person unfit to be concerned in 
the management of a company.”180 Further penalties may be 
imposed on both individuals and corporations that breach the CO’s 
procedural rules during an investigation, which include fines and 
even incarceration.181 It should be noted that the CO adopts a 
judicial model, and, therefore, penalties are imposed by the 
HKCT,182 not the HKCC.183 
Currently, the telecommunications industry is the only sector 
of the economy where concentrations can be controlled under the 
CO, since the Merger Rule (“MR”) only applies to mergers 
involving carrier licensees.184 It is possible, therefore, that a 
company that is not itself active in a telecoms market may be 
subject to the MR, if it is part of a conglomerate or vertical 
 
175 Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619 Sched. 1, § 6(1) (H.K.). 
176 Kwok, supra note 163, at 567. 
177 Id. at § 93(3). 
178 The author has described the penalties as “disappointing.” See Marco Colino, supra 
note 122, at 315–32. 
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183 On the judicial model, see id. at 563–566. 
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concentration involving at least one telecoms licensee. Like in the 
UK or Australia, notification is voluntary, and the substantive test 
used to assess a merger is whether it leads to a substantial 
lessening of competition (“SLC)”.185 The Guideline on the Merger 
Rule (“Guideline MR”) explains that the HKCC will consider 
structural factors (“market shares, market concentration, barriers to 
entry, vertical integration, buying power and import 
competition”)186 as well as non-structural factors (like the 
“strategic behaviour” of firms directed at altering the market 
structure).187 The HKCC refers to two indices, the market 
concentration ration and the HHI, as reliable indicators of the 
situations in which it may decide to scrutinize a merger. Normally, 
it will intervene where the CR4 (that is, the post-merger combined 
market share of the four largest companies in the market) is over 
seventy-five percent, and the merged firm’s market share exceeds 
forty percent. It may also look at mergers where the CR4 is in 
excess of seventy-five percent, and the market share of the merged 
company is over fifteen percent.188 According to the Guideline 
MR, markets with a post-merger HHI189 of more than 1,800 will be 
considered highly concentrated, and mergers in those markets are 
likely to be investigated unless the increase after the merger HHI is 
less than fifty.190 In moderately concentrated markets, where the 
HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, mergers may be subject to 
scrutiny if they produce an increase of 100 in the HHI.191 Below 
1,000, the HKCC does not expect to have to intervene, but it is 
worth noting that these are only indicative safe harbors, and it may 
decide to examine operations even below those thresholds.192 
There is no timetable for the HKCC to provide advice, although it 
vows to act in an “efficient and timely manner.”193 The remedies 
that may be offered according to Section 60 CO are both structural 
 
185 Id. at § 6. 
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and behavioral, although, where possible, the former are 
preferred.194 
B. The Potential of the New Rules to Address  
Telecoms-Specific Problems 
Any assessment of the impact of the CO is unavoidably 
hampered by its very limited practical application to date. As of 
August 2018, the HKCC has only brought proceedings before the 
HKCT in two cartel cases, and the outcome of both is still pending. 
However, the antitrust mileage of the telecoms sector at least 
serves to identify the most significant threats to competition in this 
industry. It is possible, therefore, to make accurate predictions as 
to the potential of the new rules to address those problems. 
Without a doubt, the most important improvement relates to 
cartel cases. Hypothetically, before the introduction of the FCR, 
Section 7K TO (and even the GCs of the licenses) could have been 
used to strike down cartels. However, the seemingly evident price 
fixing collusion between mobile phone operators that took place in 
2000 exposed the shortcomings of relying on a sectoral regulator, 
without specific antitrust expertise, as the only authority 
empowered to decide on both the existence of illegal conduct and 
the suitable punishment.195 By contrast, now there is a solid 
institutional framework in place, with an agency and a tribunal 
that, unlike the TA, specialize in competition law issues. The 
executive arm of the HKCC comprises experts who have first-hand 
knowledge of the application of antitrust rules in experienced 
jurisdictions, including the UK, Australia, the US, France, and 
Portugal. The current CEO, Brent Snyder, was Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice and prosecuted a 
plethora of cartels before coming to Hong Kong.196 Moreover, in 
both the CO and the Guideline FCR, it is crystal clear that hardcore 
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cartels constitute serious anticompetitive conduct, considered 
anticompetitive by object, and are harshly treated. The law further 
specifies that the De Minimis exception will not apply. The 
availability of leniency, one of the most valuable cartel detection 
mechanisms, ought to assist greatly in the complex process of 
gathering the necessary proof of the existence of a cartel.197 And 
the practice of the HKCC thus far reflects a tough stance on 
cartels. Interestingly, the first case the Commission brought before 
the HKCT related to the alleged bid-rigging practices of five IT 
companies. Nutanix Hong Kong Limited, BT Hong Kong Limited, 
SiS International Limited, Innovix Distribution Limited, and Tech-
21 Systems Limited may have breached the FCR in relation to a 
tender issued by the Hong Kong Young Women’s Christian 
Association (“YWCA”) for the supply and installation of a new IT 
server system. The bids submitted by the competitors purportedly 
included “dummy” bids and may thus have amounted to bid 
rigging.198 
The CO ought to further allow for investigating exclusionary 
bundling/tying practices in scenarios similar to the Banyan Garden 
Estate case discussed above, which was so disappointingly tackled 
under the previous legal framework.199 The HKCC has the power 
to conduct investigations into every market, and thus the obstacle 
which existed in that case—that the enforcer lacked the authority 
to look into the real estate market—would be easily overcome. 
Tying and bundling are expressly listed as being abusive in the 
Guideline SCR, as they may enable a dominant undertaking in one 
market to leverage its power into a second market where it faces 
tougher competition.200 However, the Guideline SCR also makes 
clear that the authority will have to show the negative effects of 
such practices, since they are considered “common commercial 
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/en/media/press/files/20170323_Competition_Commission_takes_bid_rigging_case_to_C
ompetition_Tribunal_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SDW-FYKP]. 
199 See supra Section II.C. 
200 COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 173, ¶ 4.2, at 24. 
966         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:931 
 
arrangements that generally do not harm competition and often 
promote competition,” even if the company in question is 
powerful.201 Therefore, in addition to the existence of a substantial 
degree of market power, the HKCC will need to demonstrate 
foreclosure effects.202 This will require careful scrutiny of the 
economic impact of the practice. Thus far, no cases or 
investigations on the basis of the SCR have been announced. It is 
also unclear whether the possibility of attacking tying as a 
concerted practice, which is common in the US, will be 
contemplated in Hong Kong, since neither the law nor the relevant 
guideline mention anything in this regard.203 
The insertion of the MR in the CO might be used to prevent the 
creation of market power which could threaten competition in the 
relevant market. However, this would only be possible if a telecom 
company is involved in the operation. The logic for this regrettable 
limitation to merger control in Hong Kong is difficult to grasp. As 
Cheng observed in 2007 when assessing the rationale behind the 
sector-specific antitrust rules applicable at the time,204 and as our 
analysis in Part I of this Article showed, post-liberalization, the 
telecoms markets would not appear to be affected by particular 
problems, and most display a good level of competition. 
Importantly, at the time of writing and almost three years after the 
entry into force of the CO, no mergers had been investigated. This 
is in spite of Hutchinson Telecom, the city’s second largest mobile 
operator, announcing in 2017 its intention to bid for fixed line 
businesses.205 In the meantime, Hutchinson’s UK subsidiary 
“Three” was prevented from purchasing competitor O2 by the 
European Commission.206 Of course, it could be argued that the 
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latter operation would entail more harm, since the merger was 
horizontal, and would have likely led to the creation of a dominant 
position. Yet, without a detailed assessment, it is difficult to rule 
out damaging consequences for competition even in non-horizontal 
mergers. It appears that, for the time being, the HKCC is devoting 
most of its resources to cartel investigations. In addition, the fact 
that notification is voluntary in a jurisdiction where businesses are 
not used to antitrust enforcement makes it rather unlikely that 
companies will decide to report their operations. 
The CO does suffer from two principal general shortcomings 
which are bound to affect its potential to effectively fight 
anticompetitive practices in telecoms and beyond. The first is the 
absence of hefty fines. In light of the profits that can be made from 
the activities it punishes, the deterrent effect is likely to be 
minimal, particularly for companies that operate internationally 
and that only earn a modest part of their worldwide turnover in 
Hong Kong. Another issue is the absence of stand-alone private 
rights of action.207 This will make it very challenging for 
customers and competitors of companies that behave 
anticompetitively to seek damages, as they will only be able to do 
so in the event that the HKCT has ruled that there has been an 
infringement. The Tribunal can, however, compel companies to 
pay damages on its own initiative to “any person who has suffered 
loss or damage” as a consequence of the breach.208 Therefore, 
provided that the HKCC takes the necessary steps to investigate 
potential breaches of the CO and brings proceedings against the 
infringements that it identifies before the HKCT, the negative 
effects of this limitation of the law might be minimized. Thus far, 
despite having received thousands of queries and complaints, only 
two cartel cases have been pursued. It is hoped that enforcement 
will soon pick up after these relatively uneventful warm-up years. 
 
207 Competition Ordinance, (2015) Cap. 619, § 108 (H.K.). 
208 Id. at Sched. 3(k). 
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CONCLUSION 
When discussing the potential of competition law in network 
industries, the unique antitrust history of the telecommunications 
sector in Hong Kong makes for a particularly interesting case 
study. By the time the first cross-sector legislation of the city was 
adopted, telecom-specific antitrust rules had been in place for two 
decades. They were seen as indispensable to opening up markets 
that had been operating as legal monopolies until then. The 
provisions designed to control the pricing and accounting strategies 
of the incumbents did their job at creating a level playing field, 
which would have been unattainable had they been allowed to 
price excessively low or to make access to their networks unduly 
onerous or altogether impossible. However, this success largely 
concealed the disappointing performance of the more traditional 
competition law rules when it came to putting an end to 
anticompetitive conduct and preventing the accumulation of 
market power through mergers. The shortcomings were in part due 
to the insufficiency of the sectoral regime to address the power of 
the conglomerates that dominate the city’s markets, and in part 
attributable to a flawed institutional enforcement. The sectoral 
regulator did not have the experience nor the means to assess the 
economic impact of the practices it had to scrutinize, and, at the 
same time, it found itself in the difficult position of having to 
evaluate the conduct of the companies it simultaneously regulated. 
The CO, Hong Kong’s first cross-sector antitrust legislation, 
has the potential to tackle some of these issues. It has served to 
create the HKCC, a suitably specialized, independent competition 
authority with strong investigatory powers and the expertise 
required to conduct the intricate analysis antitrust violations entail. 
The potential to combat cartels is evidenced by the firmness with 
which collusion is condemned in the law, and by the cases the 
HKCC has thus far brought before the HKCT. Yet, the absence of 
attempts to tackle both the abuse and the creation of market power 
places a question mark on the extent to which the authority is 
committed to putting up a much-needed fight against the mighty 
local conglomerates that continue to stifle competition in industries 
as vital as telecommunications. This is particularly noticeable in 
the data access market. Overlooking the threat that excessive 
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power poses for the local economy in a city where inequality is 
increasing at an alarming rate would mean squandering much of 
the potential of the new antitrust legislation. 
 
